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摘  要 
公司资本结构问题是当代金融学的一个重要理论问题。自从莫迪利安尼和米





















































Company's capital structure is an important theoretical issue of contemporary 
finance. Since MM theorem proposed by Modigliani and Miller, western scholars 
have continued to develop capital structure theory . At the end of the eighties and the 
early nineties in the 20th century, capital structure theory and market for corporate 
control theory blended together, and the school of capital structure management 
control formed. After this, capital structure selection, which taking into account the 
factors of  corporate control, has become an important issue in the academic field. 
With gradual completion of the split share structure reform, listed companies in China 
will enter a full circulation time, the market for corporate control will be further 
improved. Therefore, there exists realistic background and soil for exploring 
optimization problem of capital structure of listed companies in China from a 
corporate control point of view. With reference on thought of the school of capital 
structure management control, this paper examines the relationship between corporate 
control and capital structure of listed companies in China, and provides a new 
perspective and idea to optimize capital structure and improve corporate governance 
performance. 
First of all, this paper reviews market for market control theory, capital structure 
theory, and capital structure control theory. Followed by this, it further researches the 
characteristics of capital structure and market for corporate control of listed 
companies in China and the underlying root causes of system. Then, from both static 
and dynamic point of view, the relationship between capital structure and corporate 
control of listed companies in China is examined by theoretical and empirical 
analysis . The main conclusions are as follows: 
First, allocation of corporate control depends primarily on capital structure 
decision-making, and more importantly, allocation of corporate control plays a major 
impact on capital structure decision-making, which is tested by theoretical and 
empirical analysis. Empirical tests have shown: whether state-owned listed companies 














positively related to the rate of total debt to total asset; the impact of this discrepancy 
on capital structure is due to the nature of ultimate controller of listed company; the 
assumption that manager ownership is positively related to debt ratio does not hold; 
Degree of equity balance is negative related to debt ratio. 
Second, there exists an interaction mechanism between corporate control contest, 
transfer and capital structure decision-making. By comparing optimal capital structure 
selection models under different cases, it is found that when the company faces the 
threat of takeover, its optimal capital structure is different from the case that the threat 
doesn’t exist. On this basis, empirical test is made to find the impact of capital 
structure of listed companies in China on probability of corporate control transfer. 
Specifically, the rate of total debt to total asset is negatively related to the probability 
of corporate control transfer; corporate profitability, operational capacity, growth 
capacity and corporate size are negatively related to the possibility of corporate 
control transfer; the higher the ratio of market price to net assets, the more easier 
corporate control transfer.  
At the end of this dissertation, relevant policy recommendations are given to 
improve external governance mechanism and optimize capital structure based on the 
conclusions of theoretical and empirical analysis. 
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